The rise of populist leaders has drawn significant attention over the past two decades. Around the world, they have reshaped politics, from Donald Trump in the United States to Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Marine Le Pen in France, Giorgia Meloni in Italy, Santiago Abascal in Spain and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.

These leaders often rise to power by promising to speak for “the people” against the established “corrupt elites.” But our recent research shows that not all populist voters want the same things.

Our study examined public opinion data from nine countries to better understand what drives support for “strongman” populist leaders. The findings reveal that there are two very different kinds of populist attitudes, and the authoritarian variety most strongly predicts whether people will support a leader who is willing to bend the rules.

Nine-country comparison

We conducted public opinion surveys in France, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Poland, Canada, the United States, Brazil and Argentina. Our Varieties of Populist Attitudes (VoPA) survey included multiple questions designed to tap into the two varieties of populism.

Respondents were asked about their trust in politicians, their support for referendums, their belief that the majority should always prevail and their preference for strong leadership — even if it means violating rules and norms — as well as their degree of nationalism.

Factor analysis confirmed that the variables associated with the above questions clustered into two distinct dimensions — anti-establishment and authoritarian populism — rather than forming a single populist attitude. This suggests that populist attitudes come in two distinct forms.

Next, we examined how each type of populist attitude predicted support for prominent populist leaders in each country who had positioned themselves as speaking on behalf of citizens against corrupt elites.

The results were striking. In most countries, including Italy, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, Hungary and Poland, authoritarian populism was the strongest predictor of support for populist leaders. In other words, people who subscribed to majoritarianism, nationalism and strong leadership were most likely to back leaders willing to centralize power and challenge liberal democratic norms.

By contrast, anti-establishment populism played a weaker role, and in some countries even a negative one. In other words, citizens who simply disliked elites or wanted more direct democracy were not drawn to strongman figures. In fact, in Italy and Hungary, anti-establishment populists rejected Meloni and Orbán.

Anti-establishment populism

France and Canada stood out as exceptions. In these countries, anti-establishment populism played a more important role than authoritarianism in explaining support for populist figures like Le Pen and Pierre Poilievre.

In Canada, multiculturalism, the unpopularity of overtly anti-immigrant rhetoric and the existence of the more authoritarian People’s Party of Canada limit the appeal of strongman politics, positioning Poilievre as an anti-establishment rather than authoritarian figure.

In France, Le Pen’s focus on referendums and institutional reform, combined with the presence of Éric Zemmour as an authoritarian alternative, reinforces that her base is motivated more by democratic discontent than authoritarianism.

In the U.S., surprisingly, neither dimension significantly predicted support for Trump. This suggests that Trump’s appeal may depend more on other dynamics such as partisanship, racial and anti-immigrant attitudes or cultural identity and backlash.

These findings shed light on the different democratic implications of the two kinds of populism.

Anti-establishment populism can be understood as a demand for more responsiveness and accountability in democratic institutions. While it can disrupt existing political systems, it doesn’t necessarily threaten the basic principles of pluralism, minority rights or checks and balances. In fact, some scholars argue that this kind of populism can serve as a corrective when elites become too insulated from the public.

Why this matters for democracy

Authoritarian populism is another story. It is linked to a preference for strong leaders who are willing to bypass institutional constraints, weaken independent oversight bodies or undermine minority protections, ostensibly in the name of the people.

This kind of populism is associated with democratic backsliding of the type seen in places like Hungary and Brazil, where populist leaders have concentrated power in the executive branch and eroded liberal democratic norms.

Our research reveals that the real threat to liberal democracy comes less from people who simply dislike elites, and more from those who desire a leader they regard as tough to embody and enforce the will of the majority at the expense of minority rights.

Recognizing this difference is important when designing democratic safeguards that distinguish between legitimate demands for accountability and more direct participation or more dangerous authoritarian impulses.

Read more: Do you know what populism is? Research suggests most don't, but some view it with disdain anyway

Populism is not monolithic

For years, populism scholars have debated whether populism is inherently dangerous or potentially democratic.

Our findings show that both views can be correct, depending on which variety of populism is at play. Anti-establishment populism reflects widespread frustration with elites but does not automatically lead to democratic erosion. Authoritarian populism, on the other hand, is more likely to support leaders who chip away at democratic safeguards.

This reminds us that defending democracy requires more than just countering populism in general. It requires recognizing and addressing the authoritarian currents that run through some forms of populist politics.

This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Dr. Andrea Wagner, MacEwan University and Anna Brigevich, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

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Dr. Andrea Wagner received funding from Erasmus + Jean Monnet Chair and MacEwan University

Anna Brigevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.