Fatima, a fisherwoman on Lake Chad, sets out at dawn not just to make a living from the shrinking waters, but to pay a “tax”. Before casting her net, she must hand over part of her meagre earnings to armed men claiming allegiance to Boko Haram. If she refuses, her catch, her boat, even her life, could be taken.

Boko Haram is an insurgent network that began in north-east Nigeria in 2002 and later fractured into two main factions: JAS (Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, the original Boko Haram faction) and ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province, the Islamic State affiliate in the region). Both operate across Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Economic shakedowns like this are happening every day throughout the Lake Chad Basin. This is a vast, drought-stricken region spanning the borderlands around Lake Chad in north-eastern Nigeria, south-eastern Niger, western Chad and northern Cameroon. It is home to more than 30 million people whose livelihoods depend on fishing, farming and herding.

I am a researcher of climate-related insecurity and conflict. In a recent paper, I looked at how environmental degradation, regional instability and external geopolitical interests are exacerbating the conflict in the region. The study drew on qualitative analysis of security reports and academic literature. These include the United Nations Development Programme’s 2022 conflict analysis of the Lake Chad Basin and the World Food Programme’s 2024 climate and food-security report.

The paper sets out how Boko Haram has come to operate like a parallel government, imposing taxes on trade, farming and fishing. It offers harsh order in exchange for revenue.

I conclude from my findings that war is no longer driven only by belief. It’s driven by a collapsing economy, ecological ruin and the absence of viable alternatives.

Understanding these factors is crucial for developing comprehensive security strategies. Based on the findings I recommend five interventions: investment in the ecological recovery of the region; the strengthening of cross-border intelligence to choke the illicit trade in fish, cattle, arms and people; transparency from foreign players about their motives; the rebuilding of local economies and support for displaced communities; and lastly the rebuilding of trust with local communities.

Environmental degradation

Lake Chad’s open-water area fell from about 25,000 km² in the early 1960s to lows of a few hundred km² in the 1980s, and has generally remained under one-tenth of its 1960s extent with strong variability. This is documented in satellite analyses by Nasa and the United States Geological Survey.

This isn’t just an ecological crisis. As water recedes and fertile land disappears, fishing, farming and herding collapse. The basin hosts about 30 million people across 10 subnational regions or states.

In 2024, Niger’s floods affected about 1.5 million people nationwide, with Diffa recording around 50,000 affected and authorities on alert along the Komadougou Yobe river. The Red Cross also flagged basin-wide flood emergencies that month.

The basin’s ecological collapse has turned Lake Chad into a recruitment ground. The World Food Programme shows how droughts and erratic rainfall have crushed agricultural yields. The UN Development Programme links these environmental shocks to rising displacement, hunger and extremism.

Across the shared basin, Boko Haram has built a brutal, extractive shadow economy. In Nigeria, the group at one point controlled up to half of the fish trade around Baga. Fishermen were taxed at every stage, from lake to market. Refusal brought violence.

In Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, Boko Haram factions have orchestrated cattle rustling that has decimated pastoralist communities. My research details how armed raids strip herders of their livelihoods overnight. The stolen animals are sold through cross-border smuggling networks, feeding the insurgency. The group also taxes livestock traders at makeshift checkpoints, turning rustling and market levies into steady revenue.

Across the basin, kidnapping has become an industry. The UN reports that kidnapping for ransom remains a key revenue source for Boko Haram/ISWAP, and that a “large ransom” was paid in the 2018 Dapchi schoolgirls case. What began as ideological acts, like the abduction of schoolgirls, has turned into a ruthless business model. Ransoms pay for weapons, logistics and recruitment.

Regional instability

Ecological and economic desperation fuels regional instability. As communities fracture and compete over dwindling resources, the borders of the four Chad Basin countries become highways for insurgents, smugglers and arms.

Since 2014 Boko Haram has spilled from Nigeria into Cameroon, Chad and Niger, where security forces are stretched and coordination is uneven. Arms flow through the Sahel and abuses by security actors erode public trust, which in turn eases recruitment.

The paper details how national armies, often under-equipped and struggling with coordination, have been unable to secure this vast terrain. The Multinational Joint Task Force, a regional military coalition, has had successes but is hampered by these same challenges.

This security vacuum is the space in which Boko Haram’s parallel governance and illicit economy thrive, making the crisis a truly regional one that no single country can solve alone. The result is a conflict system that crosses borders, mixes ideology with profit, and outlasts purely military responses.

Bombs not the answer

Military force alone cannot fix this. It’s necessary to address the root causes, ecological collapse, broken livelihoods, and the economic lifelines that keep the insurgency going.

The Lake Chad Basin Commission is the intergovernmental body that manages the lake’s resources. Created in 1964 by Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, and later joined by the Central African Republic and Libya, the commission and national governments must lead with urgency and courage. They must:

  • invest in climate resilience, large-scale water management, drought-resistant crops, restored wetlands and sustainable fishing

  • disrupt illicit trade and go after the money, not just the militants

  • demand transparency from foreign actors about their agendas in the region

  • rebuild local economies and trust.

Fatima’s daily struggle on Lake Chad is not just about fish. It is about the future of the region. The shrinking lake, the abandoned villages, the armed taxmen – these are not side effects. They are the story.

This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Richard Atimniraye Nyelade, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

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Richard Atimniraye Nyelade does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.